Spoiling the Surprise: Constraints Facing Random Regulatory Inspections in Japan and the United States by Chin, Andrew
University of North Carolina School of Law
Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-1999
Spoiling the Surprise: Constraints Facing Random
Regulatory Inspections in Japan and the United
States
Andrew Chin
University of North Carolina School of Law, chin@unc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons
Publication: Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Spoiling the Surprise: Constraints
Facing Random Regulatory
Inspections in Japan and the United
States
Andrew Chin*
On the morning of January 26, 1998, a team of 100 officials from the
Tokyo Prosecutor's Office, accompanied by national television reporters,
marched through the front door of the Japanese Ministry of Finance (the
"Ministry")' to make the first arrests of Ministry officials in over 50 years.2
The chief of the Ministry's bank inspection office, Koichi Miyakawa, and
the assistant chief of the control division, Toshimi Taniuchi, were held on
suspicion of taking bribes from commercial banks in exchange for informa-
tion about the dates of surprise inspections and lenient treatment of finan-
cial irregularities. Later that week, Japanese Finance Minister Hiroshi
Mitsuzuka4 and Vice Finance Minister Takeshi Komuras resigned to take
* Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP. B.S. (Texas), 1987, D. Phil.
(Oxford), 1991, J.D. (Yale), 1998. Portions of this article were written while the author was
a 1997-1998 Olin Fellow in Law, Economics and Public Policy at Yale Law School. The
author would like to thank Susan Rose-Ackerman for helpful comments.
1 See Jon Choy, Ministry of Finance at Center of Whirlwind, JEI REP., Feb. 6, 1998.
2See Shigemi Sato, Japan's Finance Minister Quits in Bribery Scandal, AGENCE
FRANcE-PRESSE, Jan. 28, 1998.3See Choy, supra note 1. Prosecutors said Miyakawa had accepted 6.2 million yen in
bribes from Asahi Bank and Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank in return for covering up his inspectors'
findings of bad loans and disclosing the dates and locations of surprise bank inspections;
Taniuchi was suspected of receiving 2.2 million yen in bribes from Sanwa Bank and Hok-
kaido Takushoku Bank. See Arrested MOF Inspector Shelved Finding on Bad Loans, JAPAN
WKLY. MoNrrOR, Feb. 2, 1998.4See Sato, supra note 2.5See Miwa Suzuki, Escalating Japanese Bribery Scandal Claims Top Finance Official,
AGENCE FRANCE-PREsSE, Jan. 29, 1998.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:99 (1999)
responsibility for the widening scandal. In all, 112 ministry officials 6 and
six of Japan's ten leading banks7 have been sanctioned for their involve-
ment in the scandal.
The raid on the Ministry provided a dramatic prologue to the Japanese
government's current initiative to reform the nation's long-troubled banking
system. The full extent of the Ministry's role in exacerbating the Japanese
banking crisis has only come to light with disclosures by the newly created
Financial Supervision Agency. The Ministry has been forced to acknowl-
edge that its supervisory failures permitted the banking system to hide ap-
proximately $1 trillion in bad loans, with some analysts estimating that the
actual figure is closer to $2 trillion.8
The Japanese experience suggests the more general difficulty of de-
signing surprise inspection programs to enforce industrial regulations.
Random, unannounced inspections present unique problems relating to de-
terrence, corruption, and due process, each requiring a careful balancing of
interests. This Article surveys these problems with reference to the Japa-
nese banking system as well as various American regulatory contexts, and
provides an analytical framework for evaluating and improving strategies
for enforcing regulations and fighting corruption. The main finding is that
any effective law enforcement scheme based on surprise inspections must
be supported by specific anti-corruption sanctions. An additional finding is
that recently adopted self-regulation programs and proposed reforms to the
extent that they link the probability of future inspections to past compliance
have some troublesome aspects.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I presents a rational actor
model of legal compliance under an enforcement regime based on random
inspections and identifies two classes of reforms that can be applied in
combination to improve aggregate compliance. Part II introduces the
problem of corrupt tip-offs into the model and argues that exogenous re-
forms are necessary to combat corruption. Part I surveys the use of ran-
dom administrative inspections in the United States, reviews the approaches
taken by four such programs to improve compliance and fight corruption,
and describes the various constraints under which they must operate. Part
IV conducts a similar analysis of banking regulation and reform in Japan.
This Article does not attempt to provide a complete survey of bank
regulation in Japan or the United States. The more modest aim is to present
case studies of various random inspection programs, thereby obtaining a
systems analysis of the constraints facing reformers at Japan's Financial
Supervision Agency. However, to the extent that Japan's recent financial
6See Japan's Financial Supervision Agency to Start Work on Monday, Agence France-
Presse, June 21, 1998, available in Westlaw, 1998 WL 2306174.7See More Japanese Banks Linked to Bribery, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998.
8 See Tony Boyd, Rescue May Not Save All Shaky Financial Players, AUSTL. FIN. Rv.,
Oct. 16, 1998, at 50.
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reform initiative thus far has targeted the constraints that led to the 1998
raid, the analysis provides a basis for guarded optimism and suggests the
complexity of the reform task ahead.
I. DETERRENCE: FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER REFORMS
Surprise inspections encourage compliance through deterrence by as-
suring a positive probability that noncompliance will be sanctioned. Sup-
pose that each business covered by a regulatory inspection program behaves
as a private consumer, whose behavior is indifferent to the behavior of other
businesses. A business will choose to comply with the regulation if the cost
of compliance is less than the expected cost of sanctions. Where there is a
culture of compliance in which the marginal costs of compliance are rapidly
decreasing, extended periods of compliance may be achieved. The follow-
ing analysis considers how best to maximize the aggregate duration of
compliance, assuming that is the goal of regulatory enforcement.
Let C,{r) represent the cost to the i-th business of compliance over a
continuous time interval of duration r. Let pi'(t) be the probability that
business i is inspected at time t. Assume that C and pi are twice continu-
ously differentiable. Let Di be the expected penalty to business i, given that
it is inspected at a time when it is not in compliance.
The first-order condition for business i is pi'(t) Dj11 Ci'(r). Thus, the
business will minimize its total costs by choosing to comply over a collec-
tion of minimal time intervals [ta, tb], for which
Ci'(tb-t,) = pi(t.) Di = PAOtb Di
and pi"(t) D, > Cj"(tb-t), pi"(tb) Di <_ Cj"(tb-ta). Figure 1 illustrates that
each interval [ta, tb] is found by choosing the parameter s so that the graph
of the function C,'(21s-tl) intersects the graph of pi(t) Di at two points with
equal ordinates.
Figure 1: Cost
'C(21s-tl)
Stb-t pl(t)D,
Time
ta S tb
9The cost of noncompliance also includes moral costs. These are not considered here,
but may be accounted for by interpreting 6{r) to be the net cost of compliance less any
moral costs of noncompliance.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:99 (1999)
Since compliance over an x+y time interval can be achieved by con-
catenating intervals of duration x and y, we have C,(x+y) < .Cj(x) + C,{y) for
all x, y > 0. The inequality is very likely to be strict, because of economies
of scale in long-term compliance. Thus, without loss of generality, we can
assume that the functions C1 are sublinear (i.e., Ci"< 0 everywhere).
This analysis identifies two systematic approaches to improving aggre-
gate compliance. First, the cost of sanctions relative to the cost of compli-
ance can be increased by: (a) increasing the penalty D; (b) increasing the
overall probability of inspections pi'; or (c) reducing the cost of compliance
Ci. Second, the duration of the compliance periods can be made more sen-
sitive to changes in the relative cost of sanctions by: (a) reducing the varia-
tion in the probability of inspections [pi'1; (b) increasing the time economies
of compliance IC,'1; or (c) explicitly targeting businesses with relatively
high compliance costs.
These sets of approaches shall be referred to asfirst- and second-order
reforms, respectively. First-order reforms are constrained by constitutional
and statutory limits on searches and sanctions, enforcement resources, and
the positive objectives of the regulation. When first-order reforms are in
place, however, second-order reforms may supplement enforcement efforts
by reinforcing a culture of compliance. This taxonomy of reforms will be
informative in reviewing American and Japanese regulatory practices in
parts III and IV, respectively.
II. THE DIFFICULTY OF FIGHTING CORRUPTION
The purpose of surprise inspections is to enhance law enforcement ef-
forts by increasing the likelihood that violations will be detected.'0 Con-
sider now the case where an official provides business i with reliable
information that the only inspections during time interval [tM, tN]will take
place during time interval [t,,, t], with tM < t, < t, < tN. Assuming Bayesian
updating, the business will behave as if the expected cost of noncompliance
were
fl0 for t T [tin ,tn]
p'(t) Di R for t e [tm ,t,], where
R p(tN) - p(tM)
At") -At.)
"°See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 710 (1987) (finding frequent surprise in-
spections "crucial" to detecting stolen auto parts in junkyards because stolen cars are quickly
disassembled).
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Such a tip-off thus eliminates any incentive for compliance outside of
the interval [tm,t,], but increases the incentive for compliance within the in-
terval [tm,t,]. Aggregate compliance may be improved in the case where the
levels of sanctions and enforcement resources had achieved deterrence
during [tM,t] only on a proper subset of the interval [tm,t,]. Except for this
narrow case, however, tip-offs impede regulatory enforcement.
Given this harm, regulators may seek to deter tip-offs by a combination
of specific coercive (i.e., criminal) sanctions and a reduction of the under-
lying economic incentives. In the typical case where R is large, the surplus
created by the tip-off will be approximately equal to the minimum between
the cost of compliance and the expected cost of sanctions, integrated over
[tM,tm] u [t,,tN]. As noted in part I, any reductions in Ci'(r) will be limited
by the positive objectives of the regulation. An across-the-board reduction
in pi'(t) D- for all values of t would hamper first-order reforms, and a selec-
tive reduction in pi'(t) Di targeted to t e [tM,tm] u [t,,tN] would impede both
first- and second-order reforms.
This analysis suggests that a random inspection program cannot si-
multaneously maximize compliance and control corruption. Therefore,
specific sanctions are necessary to deter tip-offs. Despite this, there are few
statutory penalties for giving advance notice of a surprise inspection in the
United States or Japan, and prosecutions under these statutes are rarer still.1
III. RANDOM INSPECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, unannounced inspections are employed by both
federal and state officials in a wide range of regulatory contexts. At the
federal level, unannounced inspections play a key role in the enforcement of
laws and regulations in such areas as food safety, 2 occupational safety,13
medical safety, 14 airport security, 5 child care,
6 environmental protection,17
workplace drug testing,'8 manufacturing of government-licensed items,' 9
" See infra section III.D and part IV.
12See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 301.78-10(c)(2) (1998) (irradiation of quarantined fruits and
vegetables); 9 C.F.R. § 94.8 (1998) (processing of imported pork).
13See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,196, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.A. § 7902, at 1-
401(i) (West 1998) (occupational safety and health hazards); 29 C.F.R. § 1960.31(a) (1998)
(same).
14See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 493.49(b)(2) (1998) (laboratories participating in Medicare and
Medicaid).
'
5 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 44916(b) (West 1998).
16See, e.g., 14 U.S.C.A. § 515(c) (1998) (child development services for Coast Guard
employees).
17See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 55.8 (1998) (coastal air quality).
laSee, e.g., 10 C.F.R. Pt. 26, App. A, at (m) (1998) (employees of nuclear energy facili-
ties); 14 C.F.R. Pt. 121, App. I (1998) (Department of Transportation employees performing
safety-sensitive functions); 49 C.F.R § 40.29(1) (same); 49 C.F.R. § 199.13(a)(2) (pipeline
workers); 49 C.F.R. § 219.701(b) (railroad workers).
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and custody of valuable government property. 20 States also authorize unan-
nounced inspections for enforcing laws and regulations governing securities
trading,2' health care,22 environmental protection (both independently 23 and
in cooperation with other states 24), building construction,25 transportation,26
27 28 OS29.3agriculture,27 prisons, schools, 9 and restaurants.3 ° In addition, the federal
government conditions certain grants on the requirement of unannounced
inspections by state authorities as a means of enforcing federal policies,
3 1
and sometimes performs its own inspections to supplement and supervise
state regulators. "
Despite the importance and wide applicability of random inspections in
law enforcement, constitutional doctrines confine random inspections to in-
dustries where they can be conducted so frequently as to constitute a perva-
19See, e.g., 39 C.F.R. § 501.2(c) (1998) (postage meters).
2 0See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 109-27.5105(a) (1998) (precious metals).
2 1See, e.g., National Association of Attorneys General, SECURiTES: ATTORNEYS
GENERAL ENFORCEMENT OF BLUE SKY LAws 25 (1980).
22 See infra note 32. In addition to the examples cited therein, most other states authorize
the unannounced inspection of health care facilities. See generally Kira Anne Larson,
Nursing Homes: Standards of Care, Sources of Potential Liability, Defenses to Suit, and
Reform, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 699, 720 (1988).
23See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 14571.3 (West 1998) (recycling facilities); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-220c(b) (West 1998) (solid waste management facilities); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 2-2456 (1996) (pesticides); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 217B.070(1) (same); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 106-65.30 (1997) (same).24See, e.g., Northwest Interstate Compact on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Manage-
ment, reprinted in ALASKA STAT. § 46.45.010, art. III (1998).25See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, § 6-204 (1998) (industrialized buildings); VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.21" (Michie 1999) (asbestos removal); WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 101.92(4)
(mobile homes).26See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 99317.8 (West 1991) (bus-rail transfer stations);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-275(a) (West Supp. 1999) (school buses); MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 257.1317 (West 1990) (motor vehicle service facilities); see also New York v. Bur-
ger, 482 U.S. 691, 698 n.1 1 (1987) (citing numerous state statutes providing for random in-
spections of automobile junkyards).
27See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1303(b) (Supp. 1998) (nurseries); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 2, § 9-206 (West Supp. 2000) (animal feeding operations).28See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.510(29) (Michie 1998); 61 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 407.4 (West 1999), Tax. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 511.009(a)(15) (West 1998); VA.
CODE ANN. § 53.1-68 (Michie 1998).29See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 302A-1502 (Supp. 1997) (school facilities); IND. CODE
ANN. § 12-17.2-5-16 (West 1994) (child care facilities); VA. CODE. ANN. § 22.1-323(C)
(Michie 1997) (schools for students with disabilities).30See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-1605(1) (1998).31See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-26(b)(2)(A) (West 1998) (sale of tobacco to minors); 45
C.F.R. § 96.123(a)(5) (1998) (same); 45 C.F.R. § 96.130(d)(1) (1998) (same).32See John Braithwaite, The Nursing Home Industry, 18 CRIME & JUST. II, 22 (1993)
(noting that the HCFA "runs 'look-behind' inspections to check that the state governments
are doing their jobs").
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sive regulatory presence. The Fourth Amendment effectively imposes a
lower (but not upper) limit on the frequency of random inspections, and re-
quires that programs operate under neutral procedures that constrain the
discretion of the inspectors.33 The excessive fines clause of the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of disproportionate civil sanctions. 3
Together, these doctrines require effective deterrence to be based upon the
substantial likelihood of punishment, rather than solely upon the severity of
punishment.
Within this constitutional setting, regulatory programs must also cope
with limited resources for deterring noncompliance, as well as the potential
for bureaucratic corruption. Certain observed modifications in the imple-
mentation of random inspection programs may be understood as second-
best approaches to regulatory enforcement under conditions of low deter-
rent capability35 and/or high incentives for corruption.3 6
A. Warrantless Searches and the Fourth Amendment
Most random inspections are conducted without warrants,37 and thus
operate within a limited range of exceptions to the general Fourth Amend-
ment requirement of a search warrant based on probable cause.38 The con-
stitutional permissibility of warrantless searches is governed by a line of
U.S. Supreme Court cases that elaborate the meaning of "unreasonable
searches and seizures' '39 by "balanc[ing] the need to search against the inva-
sion which the search entails. 'A4
While an exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant
may be justified on balance4 ' in cases of emergencies42 or "special needs"
concerning public safety and health,43 warrantless searches will more typi-
33 See infra section III.A.
3See infra section III.B.35 See infra section III.C.36 See infra section III.D.37 A notable exception are Occupational Safety and Health Act inspections, for which
warrants are required (but probable cause is not). See infra text accompanying notes 85 - 89.38See Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).39The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
4 Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.41 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
42See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (holding that fire inspectors' search of a
store for arson evidence immediately after dousing a fire was constitutional, but police de-
tectives' subsequent search was not).43See Camara, 387 U.S. at 539 (citing North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211
U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of allegedly unfit food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
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cally fall into the "pervasive regulation" exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment. Since the Colonnade" and Biswell4 5 decisions in the early 1970s, the
Supreme Court has held that businesses that are "pervasively regulated' '
have a diminished expectation of privacy under a theory of implied con-
sent:47 "In the context of a regulatory inspection system of business prem-
ises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the
search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute."'' In
such closely regulated industries, warrantless searches are not categorically
unconstitutional, but may be permitted subject to a balancing of law en-
forcement and privacy interests. A warrantless search will survive Fourth
Amendment scrutiny if it: (1) advances important government interests, 49
(2) is necessary to achieve effective law enforcement;50 and (3) poses only a
limited threat to the business's justifiable expectations of privacy.1
In Dewey,5 2 the Court reformulated the Colonnade-Biswell analysis as
a two-part test focusing on the pervasiveness of the government presence:
[A] warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has rea-
sonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regu-
latory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently
comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help
but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections under-
taken for specific purposes.5 3
In effect, Dewey established that the first two Biswell balancing factors
are to be left to the reasonable determination of Congress. More impor-
tantly, the ruling elevated the last, subjective, factor to a threshold test for
the "pervasive regulation" exception, holding that an industry will be found
to be "pervasively regulated" only if inspections are so frequent that the
business owner reasonably should expect inspections "from time to time. 5 4
(1905) (compulsory smallpox vaccination); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (quarantine)).
"Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
45United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
'Id. at 316; see also Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 77 (holding that probable cause is not re-
quired in industries that have been "long subject to close supervision and inspection").47See Jack M. Kress & Carole D. Iannelli, Administrative Search and Seizure: Whither
the Warrant? 31 ViLL. L. Rnv. 705, 725 (1986) (citing Biswell as establishing "implied con-
sent" test).
4Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315.
49See id. at 315.
'OSee id. at 316.5 1 See id.52Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
531d. at 600.
5See id. at 599 ("warrantless inspections of commercial property may be constitutionally
objectionable if their occurrence is so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner,
for all practical purposes, has no real expectation that his property will from time to time be
inspected by government officials").
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The Court subsequently clarified in Burgers5 that limits on the fre-
quency of inspections need not be specified in the authorizing statute,56 so
long as the statute simultaneously constrains official discretion over the
timing of the inspections and informs the regulated businesses of these con-
straints.57 Thus, a statute authorizing random inspections would provide
notice that would be "a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant
' 58
by specifying limits on the time, place, and scope of inspections. 9
Notably, the Burger analysis focuses on the design of the program of
inspections, rather than on the justifications for any particular inspection.60
A random inspection program may raise Fourth Amendment concerns by
depriving the business owner of the predictability and regularity that would
have been assured by the requirement of probable cause.6 ' Lower courts
have acknowledged the potential for abuse of official discretion in such
programs by requiring strict adherence to both the coverage
62 and timing 63
provisions of the regulatory schemes.
Dewey has been read to require further that a random inspection pro-
gram must be accompanied by neutral guidelines governing the selection of
targets? 4 Where, however, an administrative plan satisfies the threshold
constitutional requirement that it contain neutral restrictions on official dis-
cretion,65 random selection procedures -- even those targeting businesses
55New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
5See id. at 711 n.21.
57
"The statute informs the operator of a vehicle dismantling business that inspections
will be made on a regular basis. Thus, the vehicle dismantler knows that the inspections to
which he is subject do not constitute discretionary acts by a government official but are con-
ducted pursuant to statute.... [T]he "time, place and scope" of the inspection is limited to
place appropriate restraints upon the discretion of the inspecting officers. The officers are
allowed to conduct an inspection only "during [the] regular and usual business hours."
See id. at 711 (citations omitted).58Id. at 703 (quoting Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603).
59 See id. at 711-12.
6°See Serpas v. Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23, 34 (7th Cir. 1987) (Eschbach, J., dissenting).61 See Dewey, 452 U.S. at 599-600.
62See United States v. Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058, 1062 (10th Cir. 1993) (close regulation of
commercial trucking industry did not authorize random stops of trucks in general).63See In re Hensley Adco Bucket Division, No. 4-81-34-M, 1981 WL 40358, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. May 15, 1981) (denying inspection warrant where procedures for deciding the number
and order of random inspections in a given year were not disclosed).
"See State v. Campbell, 875 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Donovan,
452 U.S. at 598 - 99.) (random stops of motor vehicles by state troopers).
65See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment requires that ...
the seizure be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers."); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978) ("A
warrant ... provide[s] assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable un-
der the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan con-
taining specific neutral criteria."); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979)
("[R]egulatory inspections unaccompanied by any quantum of individualized, articulable
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with high compliance costs -- are regarded as neutral and presumed to com-
port with the Fourth Amendment 6  The Fourth Amendment thus leaves a
wide scope for the implementation of random inspection procedures that are
predictable, neutral and reasonable.
B. Excessive Fines and the Eighth Amendment
An enforcement strategy based on random inspections must take into
account that any penalties for noncompliance will be limited -- if not by
statute, then by the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment 7 The
constitutional requirement that any civil penalty serving a deterrent purpose
must be proportional to the gravity of the offense,68 when combined with
limited enforcement resources and fixed regulatory objectives, may pre-
clude first-order reforms.
The Supreme Court has only recently interpreted the excessive fines
clause,69 but it is already clear that it covers both criminal and civil penal-
ties payable to the government that have a deterrent purpose. While the
scope of the clause is limited to "only those fines directly imposed by, and
payable to, the hovernment, it includes in all sanctions that "serv[e] in
part to punish." A sanction will be regarded as a punishment, and there-
fore be subject to scrutiny under the excessive fines clause,72 if it "cannot
suspicion must be undertaken pursuant to previously specified 'neutral criteria'.") (citing
Barlow's, Inc.,.436 U.S. 307).
6See Chicago Aluminum Castings Co., Inc. v. Donovan, 535 F. Supp. 392, 397 (N.D.
I11. 1981) ("Inspection of plants in a given industry on a random basis pursuant to an admin-
istrative [OSHA] plan containing specific neutral criteria such as that presented here, com-
ports with the Fourth Amendment."), In re Peterson Builders, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 642, 645
(E.D. Wisc. 1981) (same). OSHA targets industries having a high "hazard rating" for more
frequent inspections. See infra text accompanying note 91.
Courts have reviewed the random number tables used to select specific businesses for in-
spections to ensure that the program is neutral and applied in "a reasonable and nondiscrimi-
natory fashion," but have concluded that such scrutiny is not required for a program to pass
constitutional muster. See Donovan v. Athenian Marble Corp., 535 F. Supp. 176, 180 (W.D.
Okla. 1982). See id.; cf. In re Athenian Marble Corp., No. 81-0795-BT, 1981 WL 40360, at
*2, *4 (W.D. Okla. July 21, 1981) (finding random number tables for OSHA inspections
privileged from discovery under 29 U.S.C. § 666(0).
67The Eighth Amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.68See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993).69See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262
(1989) ("[T]his Court has never considered an application of the Excessive Fines Clause.");
Austin, 590 U.S. at 606 ("We have had occasion to consider this Clause only once before [in
Browning-Ferris].").70 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., 492 U.S. at 268.71Austin, 509 U.S. at 610.
721d. at 622 - 23 (remanding to district court for scrutiny); United States v. Ursery, 518
U.S. 267, 285 - 90 (1996) (declining to conduct excessiveness analysis at preliminary stage
of determining whether sanction constituted punishment).
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fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be ex-
plained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes." 73 Assum-
ing that the theory of deterrence ascribed by the Court to random
inspections in various contexts74 applies generally to regulatory programs
that use random inspections, the Court should proceed to determine whether
the fines are excessive within the meaning of the clause.
Although there is as yet no bright-line rule for evaluating a civil pen-
alty for excessiveness, 75 the Eighth Amendment has generally been read to
prohibit punishments that are disproportionate to the offense committed.
As the Court held in Solem v. Helm:
76
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment
should be guided by objective criteria, including: (i) the gravity of the offense
and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals
in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions.77
Notably, the excessiveness analysis does not consider a low probability
of detection and punishment to be a factor weighing in favor of severe pun-
ishment. The finding of a deterrent purpose is relevant to deciding whether
a sanction should be analyzed under the excessive fines clause, but is not
germane to the analysis itself.
The Eighth Amendment thus imposes independent constraints on the
penalties that can be imposed under a random inspection program. This
implies that an enforcement strategy cannot be based solely on high puni-
tive fines, but must also include an effective program of frequent inspec-
tions that maximize the expected cost of sanctions and support a culture of
compliance.
73Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
74See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995) (finding that important
governmental concem in "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren" supported
random drug testing of high school athletes); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S.
579, 592-93 (1983) (finding substantial governmental interest supported random boat
searches "in waters where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is great"); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660 (1979) (imputing a deterrent purpose to a random traffic stop pro-
gram, but finding the program not "sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law en-
forcement practice under the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
316 (1972) ("[I]f inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced,
even frequent, inspections are essential."); see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 293 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that random spot checks of automobiles
by Border Patrol were necessary to "maintaining any kind of credible deterrent").75See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the Excessive Fines
Clause, 76 N.C. L. REv. 407,457 (1998).
76463 U.S. 277 (1983).
77Id. at 291.
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C. Case Examples of Random Inspection Programs
The effectiveness of random inspection programs is constrained not
only by constitutional doctrines, but by agency resources. Agencies that en-
force regulations by threatening penalties are especially vulnerable to
budget cutbacks because they cannot turn to alternative sources of support,
such as user fees.
1. OSHA
Attempts to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Ace8 by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the Department of Labor
provide a paradigmatic example of these difficulties. In 1996, then-
Secretary of Labor Robert Reich observed that "random, surprise inspec-
tions remain one of OSHA's most effective enforcement tools in the pre-
vention of injuries, illnesses and fatalities." 79 Nevertheless, the shortage of
enforcement resources available to OSHA is longstanding and widely ac-
knowledged, 80 and has had the practical effect of limiting the frequency of
surprise inspections by the agency.
From its beginning, OSHA's inspectorate has been staffed at less than
a quarter of that needed to meet the minimal goal of one inspection per year
of employers in high-risk industries and one inspection per decade of em-
ployers in low-risk industries.8' Today, OSHA has fewer employees than it
7829 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-78 (West 1999). Workplace safety regulations are necessary be-
cause workers have inadequate information and bargaining power with respect to the risks
they assume on the job. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Substantive Reform, Judicial Review, and
Agency Resources: OSHA as a Case Study, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 645, 648 (1997).79Labor-HHS Budget Impasse: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and
Human Services, and Education of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong., 1 st
Sess. (testimony of Robert B. Reich, Secretary of Labor), available in Westlaw, 1996 WL
93450, at *21-23 (Mar. 5, 1996).
80In 1995, an administrative law judge refused to find the agency responsible for policing
workplace violence, noting that such a responsibility "would most surely tax OSHA's lim-
ited resources in ways difficult to control." See Secretary of Labor v. Megawest Financial,
Inc., 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 1338 (1995).
Other commentators have observed that OSHA has been so "feckless and beleagured"
that the agency itself is deterred from vigorous enforcement of workplace regulations "for
fear that Congress will massively reduce its funding and authority." See Marc Linder, Smart
Women, Stupid Shoes, and Cynical Employers: The Unlawfulness and Adverse Health Con-
sequences of Sexually Discriminatory Workplace Footwear Requirements for Female Em-
ployees, 22 J. CoRP. L. 295, 327 (1997); see also Nick Smith, Restoration of Congressional
Authority and Responsibility over the Regulatory Process, 33 HARV. J. LEGIs. 323, 327
(1996) ("instructions [in conference reports] put [agency regulators] on notice to comply or
face possible future retaliation (e.g., funding cuts or explicit denials of funds for certain pur-
poses)").
81Rothstein, OSHA After Ten Years: A Review and Some Proposed Reforms, 34 VAND.
L. REv. 71, 94-95 (1981).
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had during its first year of operation, 2 and its inspection programs have
only become more inadequate. Only one out of twenty-five job sites within
OSHA's jurisdiction has ever been visited by an OSHA inspector.83 The
budget crises of recent years have only exacerbated the problem. During
the second 1996 government shutdown, OSHA delayed more than 1,440
random safety inspections.84
The early failure to develop OSHA into a pervasive regulatory regime
also resulted in a constitutional obstacle to enforcement efforts. In Mar-
shall v. Barlow's,85 the Supreme Court found that OSHA regulations were
not sufficiently pervasive to fall under the Colonnade-Biswell exception.
86
This finding left the Court free to hold that warrants must be secured prior
to a surprise OSHA inspection, 87 despite its finding that probable cause was
not in issue and despite the Secretary of Labor's objection that the warrant
requirement would destroy the element of surprise and unduly strain an al-
ready beleaguered inspection system.89
As sections HI.A and IH.B of this article have emphasized, both the ef-
fectiveness and constitutionality of regulatory enforcement require that ran-
dom inspections be frequent and pervasive. By decimating the frequency of
inspections, OSHA's underfimding is, in Reich's words, "tantamount to re-
pealing" the labor safety laws.90
The agency has done its best to cope. The structure of OSHA's safety
inspection program represents a flexible response to severe financial con-
straints. The agency's national office assigns each industry a "hazard rating
value," and provides each area office with lists of industry workplaces
within its region. 91 Using a random number table, the area office then se-
lects the projected number of sites to be inspected during the fiscal year.92
82See Shapiro, supra note 78, at 647.83THOMAS 0. MCGARrTY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 212 (1993).
8See Job Safety Inspections Again Deferred During Continuing Government Shutdown,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA-DLR) No. 2, at A6 (Jan. 3, 1996).85Marshall v. Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
asSee id. at 321.
S7 See id. at 325.
85See id. at 320.
See id. at 316.
9°During the House Appropriations Committee hearings on the 1996 budget impasse,
Reich testified:
Simply put, the House-passed cuts would gut the enforcement of workplace protection laws. For ex-
ample, they will harm our agencies' ability to conduct random, surprise enforcement measures,
which provide a deterrent to employers who would otherwise try to cut their costs by endangering
their workers's safety, working them beyond legal hours, paying them less than the minimum wage
or flouting other minimum workplace standards.
Reich, supra note 79, at *18.
91See Donovan v. Athenian Marble Corp., 535 F. Supp. 176, 179 (W.D. OK. 1982).92See id.
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The selected sites are grouped into one or more "cycles," each containing at
least ten sites.93 The inspections within each cycle may be conducted in any
order that uses resources efficiently, but all inspections in a cycle must be
completed (with only limited exceptions) before the next cycle is begun.94
Underfunding of OSHA's inspection program, combined with low
statutory limits on civil penalties,95 create a tension between the first-order
goal of increasing the probability of inspections and the second-order goal
of reducing variation in the probability of inspections. The structure of the
inspection program reflects what might be best characterized as an optimis-
tic attempt to reconcile these two goals under adverse conditions. The
minimum of ten sites per cycle encourages all area offices to maximize the
frequency of inspections given the available resources. Each area office,
however, may choose a different number of cycles according to the relative
importance of making the probability of inspections more uniform. In those
few regions and industries where OSHA inspections provide adequate de-
terrence, area offices are free to direct their resources toward second-order
reforms.
2. Nursing Homes
A contrasting area of regulation is the regulation of nursing homes and
other health care facilities, where frequent inspections are required by both
federal and state law.96 Largely in response to strong pressure from con-
9 3See id.
94See id.
95While the cost of compliance with OSHA standards can run into the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars, see, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 527 n.44
(1981), the maximum civil penalty provided by the Act for the violation of a standard is
$70,000. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(a) (West 1998). Although this limit is considerably higher
than the original $10,000 maximum, see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
101-508, § 3101(2) (1990), these penalties cannot be expected to deter violations where
compliance costs are high. As one commentator explains:
OSHA could theoretically be empowered to increase fines progressively against a recalcitrant em-
ployer until adequate compliance is finally achieved. Given the staggering costs associated with
some health and safety measures, however, the size of such fines would have to be exceedingly
large....
Massive civil fines in this context are [politically] unattractive.... Huge civil fines would take money
directly away from corporate violators hence increasing the cost of the OSHAct to industry while
doing nothing to benefit workers directly.
Note, A Proposal to Restructure Sanctions Under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 91 YALE L.J. 1446, 1459, 1473 & n.63 (1982).96See generally Braithwaite, supra note 32, at 21-27 (1993); Kira Anne Larson, Note,
Nursing Homes: Standards of Care, Sources of Potential Liability, Defenses to Suit, and
Reform, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 699, 720-21 (1988). Larson criticizes the level of federal funding
for nursing home inspections, citing a 1979 article, but notes that after the reforms of the
1980s, "the future looks brighter for nursing home residents." See id. (citing Butler, Assur-
ing the Quality of Care and Life in Nursing Homes: The Dilemma of Enforcement, 57 N.C.
L. REv. 1317 (1979)).
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sumer groups, unprecedented resources are now dedicated to the inspection
of federally funded health care facilities.97 A 1993 survey of nursing home
inspections in twenty-four states found strong institutional support for first-
and second-order reform; i.e., frequent, regular inspections, a high prob-
ability of detecting noncompliance, and flexible, adequate sanctions:
Not only is the consistent frequency of inspection much more impressive
than in other areas of regulation, the intensity of the scrutiny is far more fine-
grained than for occupational health and safety, environmental, food, or phar-
maceuticals inspectors in any country we know.
98
Under the threat of sanctions that may include administrative penalties,
suspension of new admissions, license revocation, and criminal prosecution,
compliance is achieved 90 percent of the time without formal enforcement
actions.99 Deterrence in these cases, is "implicit and real."' 0 "[T]he United
States has tougher nursing home enforcement than any country we know;
stronger than in Australia, and much stronger than in England or Japan."'
0
'
3. The FCC and Industry Self-Regulation
Lying somewhere between the unhappy state of OSHA enforcement
and the promised land of nursing home regulation are the new and largely
uncharted territories of industry self-regulation. 0 2 While a full assessment
of self-regulation is beyond the scope of this Article,10 3 the rational actor
model raises a fundamental criticism of certain self-regulatory regimes.
The Federal Communications Commission has adopted an Alternative
Broadcast Inspection Program under which stations are subject to inspec-
tion by state broadcast associations. When a station passes an inspection
conducted under the program, the association notifies the FCC, which then
exempts the station from random inspections by the local FCC field office
for a period of two or three years.1° 4
97See Braithwaite, supra note 32, at 26-27 (describing the Reagan administration as a
"period of unparalleled regulatory growth" in the health care industry, and noting "substan-
tial further growth under President Bush").
9 Id. at 22.
99See id. at 23-24.
'I01d. at 29.
'
01 id. at 24-25.
'
02The term "self-regulation" here refers to the delegation of powers to implement fed-
eral laws or regulations by the federal government to a non-governmental organization, typi-
cally consisting of regulated entities and their representatives. See Douglas C. Michael,
Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L.
REv. 171, 175-76 (1995).
'
0
'For an excellent review and assessment, see id.
t'4See Notice of Public Information Collections Being Reviewed by the Federal Com-
munications Commission, 61 Fed. Reg. 6006, 6007 (1996).
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One claimed advantage of self-regulation is that it reduces the cost of
compliance and thereby fosters a culture of compliance. 05 The FCC's ex-
periment with self-regulation, however, cannot be defended on these
grounds. If there is a legitimate justification for the exemptions, it is that
exempted stations will tend to be firms for which compliance costs are
relatively low, and the FCC will compensate for any losses in compliance
due to the exemptions by accelerating random inspections of the non-
exempted stations. More commonly, however, self-regulation programs in
the United States are developed in the context of budget cutbacks, where
the lost inspections are viewed as cost savings 0 6 rather than as opportuni-
ties for targeting stations with high compliance costs.
Viewed from the cost-saving perspective, the Alternative Broadcast In-
spection Program cannot be said to foster a culture of compliance. To claim
this is to make the category error of counting a reduction (to zero!) in the
probability of random inspections as a reduction in the cost of compliance.
Instead, the two- to three-year exemption from programmed FCC inspec-
tions effectively eliminates the expected cost of sanctions during this pe-
riod, increases the variation in the probability of inspections, and results in
lower aggregate compliance unless the marginal cost of two years of com-
pliance for all exempted firms is zero."07 Even the most sanguine propo-
nents of self-regulation would find it difficult to claim such time
economies. In eneral, linking the probability of surprise inspections to
past compliance 1% is a clumsy and risky way to create a culture of compli-
ance.
4. Banks
In the United States, banks are subject to regulation by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and vari-
ous state agencies. In the 1970s and 1980s, the federal bank regulation
system did not effectively martial limited resources to achieve maximum
105See Michael, supra note 102, at 183-84 ("[I]ncentives [for compliance] are increased
not because the regulated entity is now suddenly more willing to comply but because com-
pliance has become easier (less costly) and has been recognized as consistent with and not
impairing or opposing the entity's goals.").
'°6See Michael, supra note 102, at 184.
107 The Florida Association of Broadcasters further assures that they "will not notify the
FCC of your station's participation in the Alternative Inspection Program until the contract
inspector has signed off on the station." See The FAB/FCC Alternative Inspection Program,
(visited March 16, 1998) <http://www.fab.org/fccaip.htm>. This confidentiality effectively
prevents the FCC from taking any steps before the inspection to compensate for the elimina-
tion of the cost of noncompliance after the inspection.
'"
8For another example, see T x. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 511.009(a)(15) (West 1997) (pro-
viding that announced and unannounced inspections of each jail will be based in part on its
history of compliance).
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compliance. Although each of the federal agencies determined its own
policy for inspection frequency, all of them sought to tie frequency to past
compliance. 1 At the same time, the agencies failed to respond to resource
constraints by targeting banks with high compliance costs. For example, an
understaffed FDIC in 1988 inspected 75 percent of the healthy banks in its
jurisdiction, but fewer than half of the problem banks.10
Section 111 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ment Act of 199111 has brought greater uniformity to the inspection regime
and reduced the correlation between compliance and inspection frequency.
Specifically, the statute requires that each agency conduct a full-scope on-
site examination of each insured depository institution that it supervises at
least once every 12 months.112 Small insured banks that are well-managed
well-capitalized, and have not experienced a change in control during the
previous 12 months, are permitted to be examined once every 18 months."
3
Certain government-controlled banks are exempted from these require-
ments. ' 4 By standardizing and improving confidence in the agencies' in-
spection schedules while allowing the agencies to target banks with high
compliance costs," 5 the 1991 act has significantly strengthened the federal
bank regulation system.
D. Anti-Corruption Provisions
Most statutory random inspection programs do not provide specific
sanctions for tipping-off targets. At the federal level, the two exceptions are
19In the 1970s, the agencies conducted examinations of sound banks every 12 to 18
months and more frequent examinations of unsound banks. See FEDERAL REGULATION OF
BANKING 54-55 (1981). With respect to sound banks, the OCC set different inspection fre-
quencies depending on the size of the bank's assets, while the FDIC and Federal Reserve
Board varied their inspection frequencies in coordination with state regulators. Id. In the
1980s, the OCC dropped its policy requiring examinations at specified intervals in favor of a
case-by-case approach. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and
Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
418 (1987).
"
0 H.R. REP. No. 100-1088, at 63 (1988).
"' 12 U.S.C. 1820(d).
i2 d.
11312 U.S.C. 1820(d)(4).114 12 U.S.C. 1820(d)(5).
15 As the agencies recently noted in promulgating regulations under section 111:
The Agencies have determined that ... [the statutory framework] is generally consistent with the
safety and soundness of insured depository institutions assuming the absence of other risk factors. A
longer examination schedule permits the Agencies to focus their resources on the segments of the
banking and thrift industry that present the most immediate supervisory concern, while concomi-
tantly reducing the regulatory burden on smaller, well-run institutions that do not pose an equivalent
level of supervisory concerns.
Expanded Examination Cycle for Certain Small Insured Institutions, 62 Fed. Reg. 6449,
6451 (1997).
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OSHA and the corresponding mine safety and health statute, MSHA. 1 6
The OSHA and MSHA statutes both provide that giving advance notice of a
surprise inspection is a crime punishable by six months' imprisonment
and/or a $1,000 fine" 7 However, even in these cases, however, the legis-
lative intent does not seem to have been to deter corruption. Instead, from
the beginning, Congress regarded the prohibition against giving advance
notice of a surprise inspection as an integral part of the protections provided
by the statutes.' 18 However, consistent with the demise of OSHA's other
good intentions,119 these crimes have never been prosecuted. 120 Given the
low incentives for corrupt tip-offs about OSHA inspections,' 2' more vigi-
lant enforcement of these laws does not appear to have been warranted.
At the state level, specific sanctions for the disclosure of unannounced
regulatory inspections have been enacted only in the context of health care
facilities. 22 Punishments range from a five-day suspension123 to a felony
conviction, 24 and may vary according to the rank of the official involved.'2
It is unclear to what extent tip-offs are a problem or how vigorously these
provisions are enforced. 26 In any case, however, the appearance of such
11630 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-962 (West 1998).
11729 U.S.C.A. § 666(f) (West 1998); 30 U.S.C.A. § 820(e) (West 1998).
... See 29 U.S.C.A. § 651(b)(10) (West 1998) (stating that one of the Act's purposes is
"to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human resources ... by providing an effective en-
forcement program which shall include a prohibition against giving advance notice of any
inspection").
"
9See supra text accompanying notes 78 - 95.
120See Barbra Marcus et al., Employment-Related Crimes, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 457,
459 (1997).
121 The analysis in part II supra shows, inter alia, that where penalties for noncompliance
are negligible, incentives for corruption will be low. See supra note 95 (describing OSHA's
low penalties for noncompliance).
122See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1309(d)(1) (1997) (health care residence facilities);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.19(3) (West 1997) (nursing homes); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135C.16(l)
(West 1997) (health care facilities); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.10(2) (West 1997) (nursing
homes); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-6024 (1996) (nursing homes); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2803(1)(a) (McKinney 1997) (hospitals); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 461-a(2)(a)(2) (McKinney
1997) (adult care facilities); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.052 (West 1997)
(end-stage renal disease facilities); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.045 (West
1997) (nursing homes); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 252.042 (West 1997) (facili-
ties for the mentally retarded); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.03(2)(c) (West 1998) (nursing homes).
123See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.19(3) (West 1997); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2803(l)(a)
(McKinney 1997); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 461-a(2)(a)(2) (McKinney 1997); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 50.03(2)(c) (West 1998).
124 See TEx. HEA.TH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.045 (West 1997).
25See NEB. Rev. STAT. § 71-6024 (1996) (providing that any director or deputy director
who gives advance notice of an inspection shall be subject to $5,000 fine).
126A search of Westlaw, ALLCASES database, found no reported case referring to any
of the prohibitions against disclosure of unannounced inspections cited in note 122 supra.
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explicit anti-corruption measures exclusively in the health care context at-
tests to the vitality of the underlying regulatory regime.1
2 7
IV. RANDOM INSPECTIONS AND BANKING REGULATION IN JAPAN
At the time of the Ministry scandal, Japanese banks, including their
foreign branches, were supervised by two institutions, the Ministry and the
Bank of Japan, which conducted three distinct types of bank inspections.'
21
First, the Banking Bureau of the Ministry conducted highly detailed sur-
prise inspections directed to ensuring that the bank ran soundly.129 Second,
the Bank of Japan conducted less exacting scheduled examinations aimed at
maintaining the soundness of the financial system 130 and protecting its con-
tractual agreements with institutional accountholders.13' Finally, the Inter-
national Finance Bureau of the Ministry conducted examinations to
supervise the foreign exchange operations of banks.132 The Banking Bu-
reau's inspection program is most germane to the subject of this Article.
Article 25 of the Banking Law of 1981, entitled "Spot Inspection,"
' 33
authorized the Ministry to inspect all bank facilities and offices whenever
"necessary in order to secure the healthy and suitable operations of the
business of the bank.' 134 The Banking Bureau aimed to inspect each bank
at least once every three years, 135 but the frequency of these surprise in-
spections was subject to numerous pressures and various circumstances.
The chief constraint on the frequency of inspections has been the size
of the bank inspection staff.'3 6 Overall, Japan's financial inspection offi-
cials number about 1,000, only about one-eighth of those in the United
States, 137 and their competence has been called into question. 138  Since
Of course, the imposition of a sanction is unlikely to go to trial because of the size of the
punishment involved is generally small.
127See supra text accompanying notes 96 - 101.
128 See Marilyn B. Cane & David A. Barclay, Competitive Inequality: American Banking
in the InternationalArena, 13 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 295-96 (1990).
129See Bill Shaw & John R. Rowlett, Reforming the U.S. Banking System: Lessons from
Abroad, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L & COM. REG. 91, 107 (1993).
130See id.
131 See MAXIMILIAN J. B. HALL, BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 149 (1993)
(citing Nihon Ginko Ho [Bank of Japan Law], Law No. 67 of 1942, arts. 42-44).132 See Cane, supra note 128, at 295-96.
133See id. at 295 n.162.
134Ginko Ho (Banking Law), Law No. 59 of 1981, art. 25 [hereinafter Banking Law].
135 5ee HALL, supra note 131, at 169 n.81; see also Cane, supra note 128, at 295 (every
two or three years); Arrested MOF Inspector Shelved Finding on Bad Loans, JAPAN WKLY.
MONITOR, Feb. 2, 1998 (every three or four years).
136 See HALL, supra note 131, at 169 nn.80-81.
137 See FSA Plans to Strengthen Staff by 200-300 in FY 1999, JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR,
Aug. 17, 1998.
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1988, scarce regulatory resources have been rationalized by varying the fre-
quency and intensity of inspections according to banks' net worth ratios, as-
set quali , management control systems, profitability, liquidity,139 location,
and size. 4 These resources and policies have in turn been subject to politi-
cal tides in the wake of highly publicized financial scandals, most notably
in 1991,141 when the target inspection cycle for city banks was reduced from
41 to 36 months.' 42 A final factor influencing the frequency of inspections
was the coordination of scheduling between the Ministry and the Bank of
Japan so that each bank is inspected annually. 43
In contrast to the situation in the United States,' 44 Japan's Constitution
imposes no practical constraints on random inspection programs. The
Showa Constitution generally prohibits warrantless searches, but there
are many exceptions to this doctrine, 146 and the Japanese High Court in at
least one case has allowed a warrantless search after balancing the extent of
the invasion against the importance of the evidence at trial. 147 Further, there
is no explicit constitutional prohibition against excessive fines. 148 There-
138 See Jathon Sapsford, Japan's Most Powerful Banks are Viewed as Rescuers, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 27, 1998, at A10 (quoting economist Richard Koo's assessment that only 200
Japanese bank inspectors "are considered any good"); Rookies Run Rule Over Banks,
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 24, 1998, at 15.
139See Hall, supra note 131, at 15 1.
'4°See id. at 169 n.81.
141 See Colin P.A. Jones, Japanese Banking Reform: A Legal Analysis of Recent Devel-
opments, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 387, 432-33 (1993) (identifying 1991 banking scan-
dals as impetus for Financial System Reform Act).
142See HALL, supra note 131, at 169 n.81.
141See id. at 149 -150.
144See supra sections III.A and III.B.
145 Article 35 of the Showa Constitution states:
The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects against entries, searches and
seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued for adequate cause and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched and things to be seized, or except as provided by Article 33.
Each search or seizure shall be made upon separate wan-ant by a competent judicial officer.
KENPO, art. 35.
146See, e.g., Banking Law, supra note 134, art. 25 (allowing Minister of Finance, "when
he deems it necessary in order to secure the healthy and suitable operations of the business of
the bank," to conduct bank inspections); Industrial Safety and Health Law, Law No. 57 of
1972, art. 91 (authorizing Labour Standards Inspectors, "where they deem it necessary in or-
der to enforce this Law," to inspect workplaces and confiscate equipment without compen-
sation); see also Rajendra Ramlogan, The Human Rights Revolution in Japan: A Story of
New Wine in Old Wine Skins?, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 127, 160 (1994) ("[A]lthough the
Showa Constitution seems to provide protection against unauthorized searches and seizures,
the law has stretched the exceptions to an almost unbelievable extent.").
147See id. at 159 & n.l10 (citing Judgment of Dec. 26, 1983, Sapporo Kosai (High
Court), 1111 Hanji 143, 144-46 (Japan)).
148One commentator has suggested that punitive fines, when coupled with criminal pen-
alties, may fall within the double jeopardy prohibition of Article 39. See Mitsuo Matsuhita,
The Structural Impediments Initiative: An Example of Bilateral Trade Negotiation, 12
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fore, the structure of the Banking Bureau's spot inspection program is con-
strained by resources, not by constitutional doctrine.
In principle, the structure of the Banking Bureau's spot inspection pro-
gram represented a fairly sound approach to enforcement using limited re-
sources. The Bureau's policies were directed to maximizing the overall
frequency of inspections while also targeting its scrutiny at those banks that
were most likely to have high compliance costs. (Coordinating inspection
schedules with the Bank of Japan created perturbations in the bureau's in-
spection probability distributions, but this second-order effect was not a
cause for great concern.) Even more significantly, the Bureau's capacity
for imposing sanctions was potentially so high as to be coercive. 149 A fur-
ther source of potential deterrent capability was the informal system of ad-
ministrative guidance that accompanies the Ministry's multiple regulatory
and managerial roles. 150
This picture changed drastically, however, when corruption came into
view. The Ministry's wide-ranging and potentially conflicting roles gave it
"the largest authority and strongest power in Japan."'' Vagueness in Ja-
pan's banking laws further strengthened the Ministry's hand. As one com-
mentator has noted, the "lack of transparency [in the banking statutes]
compels companies to develop close relationships with ministries and agen-
MICH. J. INT'LL. 436, 448 & n.33 (1991). Article 39 of the Showa Constitution states, "No
person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it was commit-
ted, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed in double jeopardy." KENPo,
art. 39.
The Constitution also prohibits "[t]he infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel
punishment," KIN o, art. 36, but the courts have rarely applied this doctrine even in cases of
extensive physical and psychological abuse, let alone monetar penalties. See Ramlogan,
supra note 146, at 181-82.
149Under the Banking Law of 1981, the Ministry of Finance had the power to revoke
banks' licenses for violation of any law, articles of incorporation, or ministry regulations, see
Banking Law, supra note 134, at art. 27; to suspend the bank's business or freeze its assets
when it deems necessary, see id. at art. 26; and to approve a wide variety of banking deci-
sions including the opening and closing of branches and reductions in the level of capital
held below a certain minimum, see HALL, supra note 131, at 149. The Banking Law pro-
vided civil and criminal penalties of up to three million yen and three years imprisonment for
violation of the ministry's licensing and examination requirements. See Banking Law, arts.
61-66.
150 See Cane & Barclay, supra note 128, at 289:
[T]rue regulatory power over Japanese banks resides in the MOF. The Banking Law of 1927 grants
the MOF such broad supervisory powers that its responsibilities have been likened to "those of the
Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Securities and Exchange Commission, state banking commis-
sions and policy-making responsibilities of the FRB." Within this broad grant of power, the MOF
has considerable discretion to tailor its regulations and policies to the needs of individual banks in
return for their voluntary cooperation with MOF directives. This regulatory style is called gyo-
sel-shido, or administrative guidance.
15 1 The ministry sets Japan's budget and economic policy, intervenes on foreign exchange
markets, grants business licenses, and issues advice to industry that is generally followed.
See Suzuki, supra note 5.
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cies in order to know whether their activities comply with current interpre-
tations of the laws on the books.', 152 As the analysis in part II shows, how-
ever, the very potency of the Ministry's discretionary enforcement power
created a powerful incentive for corruption that would be difficult to resist
even in an arm's-length relationship. In fact, the tip-offs occurred in a web
of close social relationships among bank officials and Bureau inspectors, 5 3
an environment rich in opportunities for collusion and poor in safeguards of
accountability.
The unusually intense public furor in the wake of the scandal led to a
pledge by Japan's major banks to abolish their MOF-tan, or "ministry han-
dler," system, in which bank officials had been specifically assigned to cul-
tivate social relationships with ministry officials. 54 More urgent economic
and political pressures, however, initially distracted the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party from large-scale banking reforms.' 55 The incoming Fi-
nance Minister Hikaru Matsunaga immediately ruled out a full breakup of
the Ministry and offered no programs to prevent future corruption in the
banking industry.1
56
Elections in July 1998, however, led to the resignation of Prime Min-
ister Ryutaro Hashimoto in favor of Keizo Obuchi, who took office pledg-
ing to reform Japan's banks and to take the country out of recession. 57 At
about the same time, Japan's new Financial Supervisory Agency took over
the Banking Bureau's inspection program and most of its staff, under the di-
rection of Masaharu Hino, a public prosecutor and banking industry out-
sider.158  The agency marked Obuchi's first day in office by ordering
penalties for eight banks involved in the bribery scandals. 59 Despite hav-
ing just 165 inspectors, many of them inexperienced,' 60 the agency also
conducted inspections of all of Japan's major commercial banks between
152 See id.
153See infra note 154 and accompanying text (describing the MOF-tan ("ministry han-
dler') system).
154See More Japanese Banks Linked to Bribery, supra note 7. Choy, supra note 1, de-
scribes the MOF-tan system:
Banks and other financial and non-financial firms admit to having special groups of employees
whose only job is to develop and maintain friendly relations with relevant ministry functionaries....
[T]he relationship-building usually takes place outside regular business hours in the form of dinners
or, sometimes, golfing weekends, trips and other leisure activities. These lengthy affairs are sup-
posed to provide the time to develop close personal ties and to discuss issues in depth. Critics now
say that they also serve as a convenient channel to curry favor with key bureaucrats.
55See id.
156 See Landers, on file with author.
157See Nayan Chanda, Surges of Depression, FARE. ECON. REv., Dec. 31, 1998, at 22.
' See Rookies Run Rule Over Banks, supra note 138.
'
59 See Japan's New Watchdog Bites the Banks, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 1, 1998, at 3.
16OSee New Japan Bank Watchdog Faces Herculean Task, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1998, at
Al.
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July and October 1998.161 When the audits revealed that the Long-Term
Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank were insolvent, the FSA ex-
ercised its power to nationalize them. 62 Bolstering the agency's authority
over the remaining banks is an attractive carrot in the form of a $260 billion
line of credit the government has made available to banks that convince the
regulators they are committed to reform. 63 The agency has also been will-
ing to use a large stick - the threat of license revocation -- in support of its
new inspection practices. 164 The FSA's staff of inspectors is growing rap-
idly and is expected to have more than 1,000 in the year 2000.165 If the
FSA maintains this focus on confronting corruption and challenging re-
source constraints, Japan's random bank inspection program is likely to be-
come the highly effective regulatory tool it was designed to be.1
66
Japan's lawmakers can assist the reform efforts at the FSA in two
ways. First, specific provisions are needed to combat corruption in the ran-
dom inspection program. The agency's August crackdown and the Japa-
nese legislature's proposal of a code of ethics for civil servants' 67 are a good
start, but direct prohibitions against tip-offs, backed by coercive sanctions,
need to be built into the inspection program's framework and vigorously
enforced. Second, institutional support for the close informal relationships
that breed corruption should be dismantled. In addition to the banks' move
to abolish the MOF-tan system,' 68 the legislature should clarify the banking
laws to reduce agency discretion and resulting opportunities for collusion.
161 See Top 17 Banks' Bad Loans Worth 49 Tril. Yen in March: FSA, JAPAN WKLY.
MONITOR, Dec. 28, 1998.
162 See Gov't to Nationalize Troubled LTCB, JAPAN WKLY. MONrTOR, Oct. 26, 1998;
Robert Whymant, Japanese Bank Nationalised to Shore Up Sector, TIMES OF LONDON, Dec.
14, 1998, at41.
163 See Jathon Sapsford, Funding Depends on Cleanup Plans, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1999,
at A17.
164The FSA's draft bank inspection manual states that any bank that fails to follow the
agency's risk management framework will have its license revoked. See FSA Preparing
Tough Bank Inspection Manual, JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, Dec. 7, 1998.
165 See Japan Aims to Double Bank-Inspector Ranks, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1998, at
4.
166Tellingly, inspections at Credit Suisse First Boston and Sumitomo Bank in January
and February 1999 were unannounced and unexpected, and agency directors were planning
to continue the practice of secrecy and surprise. See Japan Watchdog Inspects Credit Suisse
First Boston Office, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 21, 1999; FS,4 Completes Sumitomo Bank Market Risk
Management Inspection, AFX NEwS, March 2, 1999.
167See Barbara Wanner, Financial Scandals Renew Focus on Bureaucratic Power, JEI
REP., Mar. 6, 1998.
168Major banks have also instituted a ban on entertaining government officials or execu-
tives of public corporations. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Given the United States' apparent lack of experience with large-scale
corruption involving tip-offs of surprise inspections, the recent Japanese
banking scandal may be the most instructive case study available for under-
standing the problem and considering solutions. Part II of this Article pre-
sented the theoretical case for specific anti-corruption sanctions to
accompany random inspection programs. The Japanese experience de-
scribed in Part IV can provide further empirical support for such sanctions,
provided that American regulators are as willing to learn from Japan's diffi-
culties as they have been to offer advice.
69
Corruption is not as prevalent in practice as theory predicts. The deci-
sion of whether or not to accept a bribe in return for advance disclosure of a
random inspection is not based solely on a weighing of the available rents
against the expected penalties. Observed penalties for tip-offs are too rare
and too small70 to be explained by a pure deterrence theory. Similarly,
compliance in practice is often more common than theory predicts. Despite
this, the theoretical analysis presented in this Article should be taken seri-
ously for the concerns it raises and the reforms it suggests.
17 1
This gap between theory and practice provides some play in the joints
of reform proposals. For example, it seems reasonable to view Japan's
bank rating system 172 as a positive reform measure designed to rationalize
limited inspectorate staff, even if it is unclear whether the first-order pre-
'
69 See MOF to Hire Foreign Experts, AsAHI SHIMBUN, Feb. 7, 1998 (reporting that the
Ministry of Finance had invited advisors from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
and the Federal Reserve Board); Jathon Sapsford, Japan's Bank Overhaul Lacks Crucial
Details, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1998 (noting that U.S. government officials "have given un-
usually detailed public advice to Japan on the shape of its bank reforms").
170See supra section III.D.
171 As Braithwaite writes in the nursing home context:
[C]ompliance arises more from a desire to go along with authoritative requests to comply
with the law or authoritative suggestions to act in a professionally responsible way than from
any rational weighing of the costs and benefits of compliance.... Voluntary compliance is
underwritten by deterrence, but not in a way that often leads the [regulated business] to cal-
culate about the actual levels and probabilities of deterrent threats. Because of this, even
when these actual levels and probabilities are zero, orchestration of an appearance that they
are nonzero will often be enough to do the job.... Needless to say, however, such state
authority is a fragile accomplishment and therefore hardly a basis for sound regulatory pol-
icy.
Braithwaite, supra note 32, at 29-30. See also Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Does
Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 27 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 177, 178 (1993) (noting that empirical studies of OSHA enforcement suggest that
"[t]he complexity of perceptual processes that intervene between the threat or experience of
legal sanctions and illegal actions may weaken the link between enforcement activities and
deterrence."); see generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURIsTIcs AND BIASES chs.
14, 19, 21-23 (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds, 1982) (describing human biases in calculation of
probabilities from experience).
172See supra text accompanying notes 139 - 140.
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condition of adequate deterrence has been met. On the other hand, the de-
parture from the rational actor model also allows that policy changes may
have a signaling function. The Alternative Broadcast Inspection Program
may be interpreted as a vote of confidence in self-regulation or, perversely,
as a license to violate the law after the initial inspection.
As Japan's banking regulators are learning, random inspections present
unique and complex problems of law and policy reform under tight consti-
tutional, fiscal, prudential, and political constraints. This Article is an invi-
tation to the task of solving them.
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